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Introduction/Background
Radionuclide detection is a critic al first line defense employed by Customs and Border Protec tion (CBP) to detect the transportation of radiological materials by potential terrorists. Detection of these materials is particularly difficult due to the inher ent low-count emissions produced. These low-count emissions result when source s are shielded to hide or disguise their existence or, when being transported, are in relative moti on with respect to the sensors.
Radionuclide identification fr om low-count gamma ray emissions is a critical capability that is very diffi cult to achieve, moreover, this methodology must cope with back ground noise, finite de tector resolution, and the heterogeneou s media along tra nsport paths between the sources and detectors. De tection/identification, therefore, becomes a questio n of increasing signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) since low-count emissions become "buried" in the bac kground and Compton scattering noise, rendering a meaningful and ti mely detection hig hly improbable.
Detection of threat radiological mate rials is a difficult problem primarily because of low observable count rates and short detection intervals available. For inst ance, semi-trailer vehicles move through portal systems allowing less than 10 seconds for the initial scree ning.
Shielding materials from packaging and adjacent cargo present major difficulties in thes e low-count, hos tile environments. Low-count detection is a challengi ng problem made difficult because of background noise, measurement system inadequacies, and the heterogeneous transport paths between source and detector. Even the modern methods of gamma-ray sp ectrometry incorporating high resolution detectors are challenged by the low-count problem. These traditional spectrum analysis system s only take the distribution of energies into account and discard the important arrival time information. Thus, the basic problem we solve with SRaDS is the detection and identification of radi oactive contraband from low-c ount measurements using all of the statistical information available.
The identification of radionuclide sources from t heir gamma ray emission signatures is a well-estab lished discipline using spectroscopic techniques and algorithms. Numerous tools exist to aid the analyst interpreting these signatures. Historically, sufficient time existed to accumulate the data necessary to re asonably identify these sources.
Furthermore, highly accurate detect ors exist that yield an accurate spectrum. Unfortunately, these techniques fail on low-count measurement data. Contemporary tool s reveal that the underlying algorithms rely upon heuristic appr oaches based upon the experience - Currently gamma-ray spectromet ry is used to identify radionuclides by estimating the ene rgy distribution or spectrum. It decomposes the gamma-ray em issions into energy bins discarding the temporal information. The role of the ga mma-ray spectrum is analogous to the role of the Fourier spectrum for identifying sinusoidal spectral lines in no ise. A particul ar radionuclide can be characteriz ed by its "energy spectral lines" in the energy spectrum. These sharp lines are used to identify the corresponding energy bin, thus "detecting" the presence of a particular component of the radionuclide.
In the ideal case, the spectrum consis ts only of lines or spikes located at the correct bins of ea ch constituent energy uniquely characteriz ing the radionuclide. A search of the sp ectrum for the strong presence of these lines is used for identification . A typical laboratory spectrum is shown in Fig. 1 below where the even t mode sequence (EMS) or set of energy vs time me asurments is sh own in 1a, and the c orresponding PHS is s hown in Fig. 1b illustra ting photo-peaks, downscattering, background and noise. 
Figure 1. Laboratory Data. (a) Measured event mode sequence (EMS) of arrivals. (b) Energy histogram or pulse height spectrum (PHS).
Research Activities
SRaDS is a completely no vel software system capable of r apidly and confidently identifying any set of pre-specified r adionuclides (RN) in a wide r ange of scenarios such as portal systems, first respon der activities, verification activities, harbor and c argo inspections a nd more. It represents the next generation of radiation detection software systems based on the no vel approach of B ayesian sequential photon processing. SRaDS satisfies the critical need to dev elop a fast and reliable automated technique to de tect and identi fy radioactive materials from uncertain radionuclid e measurements especially when measurement time is short and the demand for confidence is high.
SRaDS utilizes the statistical nature of r adiation transport as well as modern processing techniques to implement a ph ysics-based, Bayesian sequential statistical processor. Instead of a ccumulating a pulse-height spectrum (PHS) as is done in current systems, each photon is processed indivi dually upon arriv al and then discarded.
Upon arrival at the detector , a deci sion is upda ted and refined using the energy deposited as well as the photon arrival time. Detection is declared when such a decision is statistically justified using estimated detection and false alarm probabilities specified by a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curv e obtained during calibr ation. This implementation results in a system that has significantly impro ved detection performance with higher reliability and shorter decision time. 
Results/Technical Outcome
The key issue that SRadS adresses is d eveloping reliable statistical models of both emissi on and measurement processes that can effectively be used in the Baye sian framework. Th ese stochastic models of the physical proce ss must incorporate the loss of information resulting from the absorp tion of energy between an ideal source and the detector. The und erlying probability distributions describe the physics of the radiation transport between the source and the detector. Our approach differs from spectroscopy in that it models the source radionuclides by decomp osing them uniquely as a mixture of monoenergetic sources t hat are then smeared , scattered and distorted as they are transported to the detector for measurement and counting. The measured data consists of a set of energy vs time measurements in the form of an EMS and is obta ined from pulse shaping circuitry available in all co mmercial radiation detectors.
While traditional s pectroscopy ignores both the temporal information as well as any energy not found in the main peaks of the spectrum, SRaDS uses all of the information ava ilable in each and every photon arrival.
SRaDS utilizes the statistical nature of radiation trans port as well as modern Bayesian signal pro cessing techniques to imple ment the processor. SRaDS is an automated technique that "decides" when a particular target radionuclide is present or not based on parame ters that evolve fr om the physics info rmation contained in the EMS. The inherent structure of the BA SIC and ADVANCED processor is shown i n at the more detailed structural leve l, the lower diagram illustrates the parallel/distributed internal structur e utilized in performing each of these steps for ea ch energy componen t of each targeted RN. Clearly, SRaDS is a distributed sequential proc essor performing its operati ons using multiple identical channels, each with a unique set of parameters suited to that particular component. 
PROCESS
Figure 3. SRaDS processor parallel/distributed structure: (a) Simple processing (upper). (b) Detailed discriminator, parameter estimation and decision function calculation (middle). (c) Multiple channels for multiple lines/multiple radionuclides (lower).
Conceptually, we depict the generic sequential detection technique in Fig. 4 illustrating ea ch photon arrival along with the corresponding decision function an d thresholds. At eac h arrival the decision function is sequentially updated and c ompared to thresholds to perform the de tection ---"photon-by-photon". The t hresholds are selected from a ROC curve and are based on user-selected detection and false alarm probabilities. In this way, SRaDS' performance can be tailored to a wide variety of field scenarios depending on the needs of the user. If the need fo r minimizing false positives is a priority, then that configuration parameter can be set accordingly. Alternately, if the detection probability must be high and there is less regard for the cost of false alarms, the system can be configured for those needs. The practical imple mentation is accomplished in various stages:
(1) photon discrimination; (2) monoe nergetic parameter estimation; Discrimination is performed with the "true" parameters obtained from the tables of radionuclides (e nergy, emission probability and rat e (interarrival)) and f rom a radiatio n transport model in the advance d implementation. From this i nformation we construct the confidence intervals to decide i f the photon arri val is valid for one of the targeted radionuclide components. If so, we then perform the parameter estimation using a linear Kalman f ilter for en ergy (Gaussian model) and particle filter for rat e/interarrival (exponential model). The emission probability is calculated by sequentially updating valid counts in the channel. Wi th the pa rameter estimates available, the deci sion function is sequentially updated an d compared to the thresholds (see Fig. 4 ). Finally, in order to calc ulate the required thresholds for detection we mus t generate a ROC curve from simulation or high fidelity calibration data and select an operating point specified by the desired detection and false alarm pr obabilities. The individual channel processor is shown in Fig. 6 illustra ting the discrimination, estimation and decision function update step s, while the detailed algorithm implementation architecture is shown in Fig. 7 . 
Figure 7. SRaDS BASIC detailed implementation structure of the overall sequential Bayesian radionuclide detection processor showing the discriminated channel inputs (energy/arrival time), energy/rate parameter estimates, probability distribution and decision function (log-likelihood) estimates with threshold detection.
The SRaDS sequential detection paradigm wa s applied to the laboratory data set illustrated in Fig. 1 . Based on the experimental SNR, the selected operating po int (detection and false-alarm probabilities) was (98%, 2%) specif ying the threshol ds which were calculated accordingly for each ra dionuclide. The system undergoes a calibration phase which consists of "tuning" the processor s on simulated and controlled data, setting initial parameters, etc. The overall results of the processing are shown in Fig. 8 . We note three columns of data, the first column is the composite pulse-height As each photon is process ed, the decision function is updated until either the upper or lower thre shold is exceeded i ndicating the presence or absence of the target radionuclide. Note that barium is detected (threshold exceeded) first (0.513 sec) followed by the cesium (0.678 sec) and then cobalt (3. 05 sec). The corresp onding pulseheight spectra at the time of detection, that is, when the decisi on 1 A video illustrating the sequential processing operations (Fig. 8) is available on the enclosed CD as an audio-visual (SRaDS_BASIC.avi ) or windows media video (SRaDS_BASIC.wmv ) file.
Cobalt
Figure 8. SRaDS BASIC sequential Bayesian detection and identification. (a) Pulse-height spectrum (after calibration). (b) EMS with discrimination (circles). (c) Decision
threshold is crossed, is sho wn in Fig. 9 . This figure illustrates not only the total counts in each energy spec tral line, but also the number of photons that were passed by both di scriminators and used to up date the decision function. Clearly, co balt has the lowest count rate and the sequential processor must wait for enough photons to a rrive in order to make t he statistically justified decision (less than 10 counts/lines), while the barium detection is faster because of its higher count rates. The performance of SRadS is evaluated using the ROC curves developed from our laboratory data. Rather than attempt to incorporate dependencies on geom etry, source emissions etc., we -19-choose to normalize the curves base d on the total number of source photons passed by the discriminators and used to update the decision function. In this way the source si ze (mass), photon emission rate, distance to detector, geometry, etc. can be captured simply by the number of discriminated source ph otons for a given RN elimina ting specifics. We show ROC curves for our 133 Ba source in Fig. 10 . Here we see SRadS performance ranging from 5 total barium photons (including background etc.) to 50 ba rium photons. As expected as the number of photons increase, the processor performance improves significantly yielding higher dete ction probabilities and lower false alarm rates. We us e these ROC curve s to calculate the r equired upper and lower thresholds for SRadS, thereby, quantifying its expected performance. As our fi nal tests, we performed some figur e-of-merit (FOM) runs to benchmark the performance of both the BASIC and ADVANCED processors and also comp ared their performance to the GAMANL radiation detection (standard) software. We s ummarize this comparison simply that based on an ensemble of 100 la boratory data files (Barium radio nuclide) that the SRaDS B ayesian processor was able to a chieve a detection probability of 98%, while the G AMANAL processor could only achieve a 45 % probability of detection. We showed the ROC curves for SRaDS in Figure 10 where we chose our thresholds to achieve a 98% detect ion probability at a 2% false alarm rate.
Cobalt
Figure 11. SRaDS ADVANCED sequential Bayesian detection and identification. (a) Pulse-height spectrum (after calibration). (b) EMS with discrimination (circles). (c)
Exit Plan
The plan for this exciting technology is to develop the algorithms further in conjunction with a variet y of instrumentation manufacturers either through Work-For-Others co ntracts or CRADA agr eements. We have submitted an R&D 100 applicati on and expect to get exposure of our research through that mech anism as through the sci entific publications referenced subsequently. We have also applied to the DOE NA-22 organization for developmental funding. Currently we are team with the company ICx in response to a DNDO BAA and expe ct to expand the efforts to sodium-iodid e and other lower resolution but huge application volume detectors. Of course, our main tar get is licensing and royalties in a n effort to get the technology to the commercial sector
Summary
This project has progressed nicely fr om a high-risk, high payoff novel conceptual approach to an actual su ite of software algorithms ca pable of meeting all of t he initial expect ations of t he Bayesian approach.
Besides being extremely exciting for the researche rs, it clearly demonstrates the teaming abil ity of mul ti-disciplinary projects resulting in a success and major cont ribution to radiat ion detection.
Having access to the "old sa lts" (LLNL consultants-see acknowledgements) to ke ep us on track and contribute viable discussion and counterpoints to our arguments, led us to the final prototype design whic h will even tually be constructed thr ough potential CRADS or WFO projects to follow (see EXIT Plan). Abstract-The detection of radioactive contraband is a critical problem is maintaining national security for any coun try. Photon emissions from threat materials challenge both detection and measurement technologies especially when concealed by various types of shielding complicating the transport physics significantly. This problem becomes especially important when ships are intercepted by U.S. Coast Guard harbor patrols searching for contraband. The development of a se quential modelbased processor that captures bo th the underlying transport physics of gamma-ray emissions including Co mpton scattering an d the measurement of photon energies offers a physics-based approach to attack this challenging problem. The inclusion of a basic radionuclide representation of absorbed/scattered photons at a given energy along with interarrival times is used to extract the physics information available from the noisy measurements portable radiation detection systems us ed to interdict contraband. It is shown that this physics representation can incorporated scattering physics leading to an "extended" model-based structure that can be used to develop an effective sequential detection technique. The resu lting model-based processor is shown to perform quite well based on data obtained from a controlled experiment.
IEEE Oceans '10 Conference, Sydney, Austria May, 2010 (LLNL-CONF-425060 ).
• Abstract-The timely and accurate detection of nucl ear contraband is an extremel y important problem of national sec urity. The development of a prototype sequentia l Bayesian processor that inco rporates the underlying physics of -ray emissions and the measurement of photon energies and their intera rrival times that offers a physics-based approach to attac k this ch allenging problem is desc ribed. A basic radionuclide representation in t erms of its -ray energies a long with photon interarrival times is used to ex tract the p hysics information available from the uncertain measurements. It i s shown that not only does thi s approach l ead to a physics-based structure that can be used to develop an effective threat detection technique, but also motivates the implementation of thi s approach using advanced sequential Monte Carlo processors or pa rticle filters to extract the requi red information. The resulting processor is appl ied to experimental data to demonstrate its feasibility. SCIENCE, VOL. 56, NO. 6, DECEMBER 2009 pp. 3694-3711 (LLNL-JRNL-411357 Abstract-Radionuclide emissions from nuclear contraband challenge both detection and measurement technologies to capture and record each event. The developm ent of a seque ntial Bayesian processor inco rporating both the physics of gamma ray emissions and the measurement of photon energies offers a physics-based approach to attack this challenging problem. It is shown that a "physics-based" structure can be used to develop an effective detect ion technique, but al so motivates the implementation of this approach using pa rticle filters to enhance and extract the required information. The resulting processor i s applied t o feasibility data obtained from a controlled proof-of-concept experiment.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR
IEEE Oceans '09 Conference, B iloxi, MS Oct., 2009 (LLNL-CONF-411355).
• Bayesian Processing for the Detection of Radioactive Contraband from Uncertain Measurements James V. Candy, Kenneth Sale, Brian L. Guidry, Eric Breitfeller, Douglas Manatt and David Chambers
Abstract-With the increase in terrorist activities throughout the world, the need to develop techniques capable of detecting radioactive contraband in a timely manner is a critical requirement. The development of Bayesian processors for the detection of contraband stems from the fact that the posterior distribution is clearly multimodal eliminating the usual Gaussian-based processors. The development of a sequential bootstrap processor for this problem is discussed and shown how it is capable of providing an enhanced signal for eventual detection. ABSTRACT-The development of faster more reliable techniques to detect radioactive contraband in a portal type scenario is an extremely important problem especially in this era of constant terrorist threats. Towards this goal the development of a model-based, Bayesian sequential data processor for the detection problem is discussed. In the sequential processor each datum (detector energy deposit and pulse arrival time) is used to update the posterior probability distribution over the space of model parameters. The nature of the sequential processor approach is that detection is produced as soon as it is statistically justified by the data rather than waiting for a fixed counting interval before any analysis is performed. In this paper the Bayesian model-based approach, physics and signal processing models and decision functions are discussed along with the first results of our research.
